My published research focuses on agenda-setting, organized interests, lobbying, and public policy decision-making. My work broadly examines the policy process and the political actors that attempt to garner favorable policy outcomes.
LaPira, Timothy M. and Herschel F. Thomas. In press. Revolving Door Lobbying: Public Service, Private Influence, and the Unequal Representation of Interests. University Press of Kansas. (Spring 2017 expected publication)
LaPira, Timothy M., Herschel F. Thomas III, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2014. Washington Lobbyists in the Core and on the Periphery. Interest Groups and Advocacy, 3(3): 219-245.
Boydstun, Amber E., Shaun Bevan, and Herschel F. Thomas III. 2014. The Importance of Attention Diversity and How to Measure It. Policy Studies Journal, 42(2): 173-196.
For decades, political scientists have had two divergent views on lobbyists in Washington. On the one hand they focus on the privileged access of a few groups in balkanized issue niches, and on the other they observe highly inclusive lobbying campaigns where hundreds of lobbyists vigorously compete for policymakers’ attention. Not surprisingly, these disparate observations lead to contradictory conclusions about lobbying tactics, relations with relevant policymakers and the nature of interest group influence. In this article, we make a simple, yet novel, empirical observation: these seemingly incongruent observations of lobbying at the micro level are not inconsistent when we uncover the structure of lobbyists’ interactions at the macro level. That is, both views are correct, depending on the policy context. Using data from 248,543 Lobbying Disclosure Act reports filed between 1998 and 2008 – which consists of 1,557,526 observations of 32,700 individual lobbyists reporting activity in 78 issue areas – we reveal that the Washington lobbying community has a fundamental and stable core–periphery structure. We then document how the empirically derived core–periphery mapping is a superior way to differentiate bandwagon or niche policy domains. As transaction cost theory suggests, we find that policy domains in the core have more in-house lobbyists and more revolving door lobbyists. And, on average, lobbyists active in core domains represent a greater diversity of interests and tend to be policy generalists. Available here
Theriault, Sean T. and Herschel F. Thomas III. The Diffusion of Support for Same-Sex Marriage in the US Senate. 2014. PS: Political Science and Politics, 47(4): 824-828.
Studies of political attention often focus on attention to a single issue, such as front-page coverage of the economy. However, examining attention to a single issue without accounting for the agenda as a whole can lead to faulty assumptions. One solution is to consider the diversity of attention; that is, how narrowly or widely attention is distributed across items (e.g., issues on an agenda or, at a lower level, frames in an issue debate). Attention diversity is an important variable in its own right, offering insight into how agendas vary in their accessibility to policy problems and perspectives. Yet despite the importance of attention diversity, we lack a standard for how best to measure it. This paper focuses on the four most commonly used measures: the inverse Herfindahl Index, Shannon’s H, and their normalized versions. We discuss the purposes of these measures and compare them through simulations and using three real-world datasets. We conclude that both Shannon’s H and its normalized form are better measures, minimizing the danger of spurious findings that could result from the less sensitive Herfindahl measures. The choice between the Shannon’s H measures should be made based on whether variance in the total number of possible items (e.g., issues) is meaningful. Available here
Jones, Bryan D., Herschel F. Thomas III, and Michelle Wolfe. 2014. Policy Bubbles. Policy Studies Journal, 42(1): 146-171.
Advocates for same-sex marriage have had much to celebrate. The last few years have shown that state after state and senator after senator have declared their support for full marriage equality. Such momentum suggests that their goals will be realized sooner rather than later. In this article, we analyze when senators announce their support for same-sex marriage. Contrary to the popularly held belief that their decisions will quickly snowball into filibuster-proof numbers, we find that most of the easy successes have already been achieved. The difficulty of securing the last few votes may take much longer. Available here
LaPira, Timothy M. and Herschel F. Thomas III. 2014. The Revolving Door and Interest Representation. Interest Groups and Advocacy, 3(1): 1-26.
We develop the concept of a policy bubble to capture the notion of long-term overinvestment in a policy. In sketching the relation of policy bubbles to economic bubbles, we describe how these two concepts have similar origins but different trajectories because they are filtered by different institutions. We examine in some detail three likely instances of ongoing policy bubbles: crime policy, school reform (charter schools and private education vouchers), and the contracting and privatization of public services. We show how these cases differ from the housing bubble of 1997–2007, how they differ from each other, and the extent to which they can be considered policy bubbles. Last, we suggest this concept can help unify the policy process literature with the practice of policy evaluation and outline testable hypotheses for future research. Available here
Halpin, Darren R. and Herschel F. Thomas III. 2012. Evaluating the Breadth of Policy Engagement by Organized Interests. Public Administration, 90(3): 582-599.
Although experience inside the halls of power afford lobbyists valuable political, policy and procedural skills that can improve the deliberative process, it also gives them privileged access to former employers that others do not have. Washington’s revolving door evokes legitimate ethical concerns, such as when former legislators resign their seats to take lucrative jobs representing the very industries they regulate. However, social scientists know surprisingly little about the revolving door beyond such sensational, albeit important, cases. To shed more light on the broader phenomenon, we systematically explore the revolving door on a large scale to answer a simple question: Do revolving door lobbyists represent different interests than conventional lobbyists? Using evidence from original data on the professional biographies of roughly 1,600 registered lobbyists – which we link to data from almost 50,000 quarterly Lobbying Disclosure Act reports – we find that revolving door lobbyists have worked mostly in Congress, tend to work as contract lobbyists rather than in-house government-relations staff and are more likely to specialize in lobbying for appropriations earmarks. Then, after controlling for a variety of lobbying specializations, we show that former members of Congress are no more likely than other lobbyists to attract a more economically diverse set of clients than their conventional-lobbyist counterparts. However, congressional staffers who had worked their way up the organizational ladder on Capitol Hill do. We infer that well-connected congressional staffers who spin through the revolving door sell access to key decision makers in Congress, not their industry- or issue-specific technical or substantive expertise. Available here
Halpin, Darren R. and Herschel F. Thomas III. 2012. Interest Group Survival: Exploring Mortality Anxiety. Interest Groups and Advocacy, 1(2): 215-238.
This article probes the variation in the breadth of policy engagement among organized interests. The literature, heavily shaped by large-n US studies of Washington and its lobbying system, suggests many reasons for organized interests to focus policy engagement relatively narrowly. This claim of policy specialization has been long repeated in the British public policy literature. The aim of this article is to empirically test the extent to which expectations of narrowed engagement hold in a UK context. This article uses a new Scottish dataset that tracks actual engagement by any organized interest on executive policy consultations over a 25-year period. It tracks over 90,000 ‘mobilization events’ by over 18,000 organizations in 1,690 distinct consultation issues across the entire Scottish policy system. In analysing these data, we concern ourselves with establishing: (1) the extent of generalized engagement; (2) the type of organized interests that are more or less general in their engagement; and (3) the extent to which a specialized style of policy engagement is on the increase over time. In the process, we develop measures that are appropriate for assessing breadth of engagement using issue-based policy data. Available here
Maitland, Carleen, Herschel F. Thomas III, and Louis-Marie Ngamassi. 2012. Internet Censorship and the Protection of Human Rights: An Organizational Informatics Perspective. Journal of Information Technology, 27(4): 285-300.
In order to engage in public policy, interest groups need to survive and thrive as organizations. What factors shape perceptions of group entrepreneurs as to the future prospects for their groups’ survival? The careful and ambitious work of Gray and Lowery (and others working in the population ecology paradigm) has drawn attention to that fact that not all groups that are born survive. This observation raises the question: what leads groups to ‘feel’ anxiety about their organizational mortality? In their 1997 article, utilizing survey data on the organizational characteristics and situational dynamics of a sample of groups lobbying in several US states, Gray and Lowery asked just that question: what are the levels of ‘mortality anxiety’ among groups still alive? In this article, we revisit this question using similar data, but with some additional variables, and for a non-US case (namely, post-devolution Scottish public policy). In sorting out what factors are associated with anxiety, our analysis seeks to weigh up the existing ecological emphasis on broad shifts in population-level forces (that is, competition) with group-level variables reflecting adaptive changes (that is, identity, uniqueness, changes). Available here
Using an organizational informatics approach, this study explores the implications of human rights organizations’ use of censorship circumvention technologies. Through qualitative analyses of data collected through in-depth interviews, the research examines the factors influencing the use of circumvention technologies and the organizational effects of their use. The outcomes include a revised model of censorship circumvention technology use as well as a new model situating human rights organizations and their audiences in bidirectional information flows. The research provides recommendations for practice as well as insight for organizational informatics and information systems security research in the areas of protective technologies, awareness, detection, and physical security. Available here
Lewallen, Jonathan and Herschel F. Thomas III. 2016. Bounded Rationality. In Stephen Schecter (Ed.), American Governance. Macmillan Reference.
Jones, Bryan D. and Herschel F. Thomas III. 2012. Bounded Rationality and Public Policy Decision-Making. In E. Araral, S. Fritzen, M. Howlett, M. Ramesh, and X. Wu (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Public Policy. New York, NY: Routledge.