Timothy LaPira (JMU) and I are exploring the size and scope of Washington’s revolving door, and its impact on interest representation. Our ongoing work has been mentioned in the New York Times, Politico Influence, National Journal, Monkey Cage, and the Election Law Blog, and is forthcoming in Interest Groups & Advocacy.
In my dissertation research, I argue that cue-taking among highly interdependent political actors should play a more central role in our understanding of the policy process, and agenda-setting in particular. As a standalone component of the project, I build an agent-based model (“AgendaSim“, pictured above) to simulate how cue-taking behavior, under various conditions, shapes patterns in policy agendas.
As a GRA for Bryan Jones, I manage the Policy Agendas Project. We collect and organize data about the national policy agenda as well as classify observations according to issue area. We currently host 12 datasets (over 260,000 observations since 1946) and release regular updates for the research and educational communities.
In a forthcoming article in Policy Studies Journal, Bryan Jones, Michelle Wolfe, and I develop the concept of a ‘policy bubble’: how government can overinvest in a particular policy instrument beyond the value of the policy solution. Also, Bryan Jones and I have written a chapter that updates ideas about bounded rationality in public policy decision-making.