Timothy LaPira (JMU) and I are exploring the size and scope of Washington’s revolving door, and its impact on interest representation. Our ongoing work has been mentioned in The Hill, The New York Times, Politico Influence, and National Journal. We recently authored a guest post on the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog, published an article in Interest Groups & Advocacy, and are working on a book that is under contract with the University Press of Kansas.
My recent work on the policy process studies the allocation of attention to policy issues and the micro-foundations of public policy decision-making. My published work includes two articles in Policy Studies Journal: a conceptual paper that defines ‘policy bubbles‘ as government overinvestment in a particular policy instrument and a methodological piece that offers a new way to measure diversity in attention to policy issues over time. I have also coauthored book chapters that update ideas about bounded rationality and discuss origins of the concept. In an ongoing project, my coauthors and I examine how policymakers struggle to make choices during times of uncertainty (e.g. during crises or when new issues emerge on the government agenda).
My dissertation is a study of contagion and bandwagon effects in policymaking. I argue that a process of ‘issue contagion’ explains rapid changes in the attention of policy elites as they struggle to attend to an array of pressing issues and problems. This contagion process develops as policy elites mimic the behavior of their peers due to inherent cognitive limits and strong incentives to closely monitor the political environment. To examine the conditions under which issue contagion develops, I build a computational model of agenda-setting behavior (AgendaSim). I test the empirical implications of the model by applying it to the statements of members of Congress and the lobbying activity of organized interests. With implications for how scholars interpret large changes in public policy, the core contribution of my project is that patterns in attention to policy issues are a function of a contagion process generated by imitation and cue-taking among elites.
Darren Halpin (ANU) and I have been working on a series of papers studying interest group behavior in the US, UK, and Australia. We originally focused on interest groups participating in Scottish executive consultations and examined the breadth of their policy activities, how they respond to competition and mortality anxiety, and the mobilization of infrequent actors. We are now working on research that examines how interest groups in the US and Australia use media releases to signal policy preferences to those in government.